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In response to Peru's expropriation of the Peruvian properties
and investments of the International Petroleum Company, a
subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey,' President Nixon warned
that unless adequate, prompt, and effective compensation was paid
to IPC by April 9, 1969, he would have no choice but to terminate
both American foreign aid to Peru and Peru's quota of American
sugar imports. 2 Peru subsequently charged that the United States
was engaged in "economic aggression" and threatened to create a
bloc of Latin American nations to oppose the economic interests of
3
the United States.
Although many Peruvians, and others, would be incredulous, the
President, who it is commonly supposed controls the conduct of
American foreign affairs, was compelled to take the steps he did by
congressional legislation: the so-called Hickenlooper Amendment to
the Foreign Assistance Act 4-the basic statute governing the United
States' foreign aid program-and section 408(c) of the Sugar Act
of 1948. s This article investigates the constitutionality of the
Hickenlooper Amendment and other similar congressionallyimposed restrictions on the President's discretion 6 in foreign aid. It
will be seen that the Constitution, as it has developed, has conferred
upon the executive branch exclusive powers over a "core area" of
1. Some of the long history of the dispute that culminated in the expropriations is set out
in Goodwin, Letterfrom Peru, NEW YORKER, May 17, 1969, at 41.
2. N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1969, at 9, col. 3.
3. N.Y. Times, May 2, 1969, at 8, cols. 1-2.
4. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 620(e), 22 U.S.C. § 2 3 7 0(e)(1) (1964).
After his initial response, President Nixon sent a special emissary, John N. Irwin 11, to
Peru. As a result, Secretary of State Rogers was able to announce on April 7, 1969, that the
good faith discussions between the Peruvian government and IPC constituted "appropriate
steps" within the meaning of section 620(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) that would
toll its running, at least temporarily. N.Y. Times, April 8, 1969, at I, col. 1. As of the date
of publication of this article, its running still remains tolled.
5. 7 U.S.C. § 1158(c) (1964).
6. These restrictions in the FAA, and other legislation governing the foreign aid
program-which relate to the commencement and continuation of aid to all or particular
countries as well as to its amount, conditions, and character-will be discussed in greater
detail, along with the Hickenlooper Amendment, in Part II of the article. Some of these other
restrictions have also been applied to Peru in recent years. See, e.g.. FAA § 620(o), 22
U.S.C. § 2370 (o) (Supp. IV, 1969) (with respect to countries seizing United States fishing
vessels) and FAA § 620(v), 22 U.S.C. § 2370(v) (Supp. IV, 1969) (with respect to countries
purchasing sophisticated weapons); cf Foreign Military Sales Act § 3(b), 22 U.S.C. § 2753
(1964) (the so-called Pelly Amendment dealing with the seizure of fishing vessels). It was the
invocation of this last provision which apparently led to Peru's cancellation of its invitation
to the Rockefeller mission in June, 1969. N.Y. Times, June 15, 1969, at 25, col. I.
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decisions in the field of foreign affairs, and this article will explore
the extent of this core and delineate the congressional controls or

interference from which this core area is immune. What is involved
is an examination of one aspect of the "separation of powers"; more

specifically, a clarification of the interrelation of the independent
powers of the executive in foreign affairs and the legislative powers

of Congress, principally the appropriations power, with respect to
foreign affairs. 7 Following a discussion in Part I of the constitutional

development of standards affecting the separation of foreign affairs
powers, this article will investigate in Part IIthe manner in which
these powers have interacted in the area of foreign aid. Because

Congress can completely withold from the executive appropriations
for foreign aid, it has been suggested that it can do "less" and

restrict the discretion of the President with respect to foreign aid in
any way that it wishes.8 This article concludes that such may not be
the case.
PART I

THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDARDS WITH RESPECT TO THE SEPARATION
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWERS
There are no directly relevant court cases involving the
separation of powers with respect to foreign aid;' nor are there

congressional-executive precedents on all fours with the issues raised
in this article; I° nor is there much scholarly writing on the subject."
7. Although questions of war and foreign affairs are often related, this article does not focus
on the former, or on the relation of executive and congressional powers with respect to it, The
President's "war-making power" does, however, provide some useful analogies with respect
to foreign affairs and foreign aid. See Revely, Presidential War-Making: Constitutional
Prerogativeor Usurpation? 55 VA. L. REV. 1243 (1969); Note, Congress, The President, and
the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1771 (1968).
8. See, e.g., the statements of Senators Saltonstall and Keating upon the submission of an
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 107 CONG. REC. 14694 (1961); cf
Nobleman, FinancialAspects of Congressional Participationin Foreign Relations, 289
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOCIAL SC. 145, 146 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Nobleman].
9. The foreign aid program has only rarely given rise to litigation, and the issues raised
have not involved the separation of powers. E.g., United States v. Concentrated Phosphate
Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199 (1968) (application of Webb-Pomerene Act to foreign aid
commodity program).
10. The term "congressional-executive precedents" includes episodes, usually not giving rise
to litigation, in which issues of the separation of powers between the executive and the
Congress are contested between those branches, as well as statements and opinions by officials
of the executive-such as the Attorney General-and instruments of the legislature-such as
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Therefore, an examination of the constitutional standards developed
for foreign affairs generally is necessary. So defined, these standards
may then be applied to foreign aid specifically.
EXECUTIVE POWERS

The Constitution has conferred upon the President a wide range
of foreign affairs powers: "independent" powers, so-called because

they have not been delegated to the President by the Congress. The
situation is quite different from that of domestic affairs where the
President has few independent substantive powers;12 most of the

President's vast powers in the domestic area having been delegated. 3
While the Constitution nowhere expressly grants the President
powers over "foreign affairs" as such, he has been deemed to derive

such authority from a number of other powers which, taken together
or separately, have been the subject of express grant:" principally,

the "executive power,'

'

the powers of "Commander-in-Chief,"' '

and, to a lesser degree, the power to appoint and receive
7
ambassadors .
committees-which may over time give rise to constitutional standards accepted by all the
branches of government. The statements of just one branch may of course be no more than
those of an "advocate." See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 611,
640 (1952). It can be argued that such episodes and statements as there have been with respect
to foreign aid have not focused on issues peculiar to foreign affairs, but might have arisen
with respect to domestic programs as well. See Part II.
11. Nobleman 145 n.2.
12. One of the President's independent domestic substantive powers is the pardon power.
U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl.1; In re Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925); United States v. Klein,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
13. The outer limits of congressional power tn delegate to the executive in the domestic area
are discussed in Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944), and Yakus. v. United States, 321
U.S. 4 t4,(1944).
14. See REssaTEmEN- (SECoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 121, comment a at 379
(1965); Bishop, The Structureof Federal Power Over ForeignAffairs, 36 MINN. L. Rv. 299
(1952). See also Youngstown Sheet &Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
15. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1,cl.1. It is now generally conceded that this clause is not
merely declaratory but constitutes an affirmative grant of power. Mathews, The Constitutional
Power of the President to Conclude InternationalAgreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345, 350 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as Mathews].
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
I.
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2, § 3. The role of the President as "sole organ" for
foreign affairs as well as his recognition powers have been said by some to derive, in part at
least, from these powers. E.

CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

71

(1917) [hereinafter cited as CORWIN-FoREIGN RELATIONS]. It has also been suggested that
the requirement that the President "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed," U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3, may be a source of presidential power. Thus, it is this clause that requires
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Independent Powers

Speaking of the President's foreign affairs powers, former
Attorney General and Undersecretary of State Katzenbach stated

that "[t]he Founding Fathers did not attempt to spell out the outer
limits of Executive or Legislative powers ... ."I' The outer limits
of the President's foreign affairs powers are in fact unclear. It has
been stated by the Supreme Court that the national government 9
received its foreign affairs powers as "necessary concomitants of

nationality,"' 0 and the Court has strongly suggested that the
executive is the repository of such powers. 2' The extent of the powers

of the national government-and probably the President-is in
concept equal to those of other nation-states. Thus the Court noted
in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.22 that "[a]s a

member of the family of nations, the right and power of the United
States in

. .

. [the field of external affairs] are equal to the right and

power of the other members of the international family."'

As a

practical matter they are far greater than most. Indeed, as the world

role of the United States has grown, the power and responsibilities
24
of the Government and the President have grown accordingly.

Notwithstanding Mr. Katzenbach's demurral-"I am not
suggesting that the Constitution can be amended by international
developments"

2.-

the necessity which has often led to an

the President to cause international law and treaties to be executed. See Martin v. Mott, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 10 (1827); Mathews nn.88, 107, 115, 118-20.
Most discussions of the President's foreign affairs powers do not deal with his exclusive
powers, with which this article is concerned, but rather with the wider range of his independent
powers, and with the treaty power, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.1, which he shares with the
Senate.
This article will initially consider both aspects of his powers: the independent powers because
their growth has probably enlarged the area of exclusive powers and the treaty power because
of the number of useful analogies that it provides.
18. Hearings on S. Res. 151 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong.,
Ist
Sess. 185 (1967) (letter to Senator McCarthy) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Hearings].
19. Professor Corwin points out that what is often called the federal government is in fact
the national government at the center of the federal system. Corwin, The Spending Power of
Congress-Apropos the Maternity Act, 36 HARV. L. REV. 548, 549 (1923) [hereinafter cited
as Corwin-SpendingPower].
20. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
21. Id. at 319-22.
22. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
23. Id. at 318; cf.Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
24. According to Mr. Katzenbach, "we have a responsibility which simply comes from the
position of the United States in the world today." 1967 Hearings 179.
25. Id. at 161.
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enlargement of the outer limits of presidential power26 has, in fact,
added to the content of the President's foreign affairs powers.

The assertion of independent power by the President has a long
history, including such famous episodes as President Washington's

proclamation of neutraility in 1793 and his Farewell Address in
1796,27 Jefferson's Louisiana Purchase,28 the Rush-Bagot Agreement
of 1817 demilitarizing the American-Canadian border,2 9 the Monroe

Doctrine of 1823,30 President Polk's initiative in committing the
United States to the war with Mexico, 3' the "opening-up" of Japan

by Commodore Perry's visit in 1853,32 the peace protocol with Spain
in 1898, 33 the use of American troops by President McKinley in the
Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900 to promote America 's
"commercial development" there, 34 Theodore Roosevelt's placing
the customs houses of Santo Domingo under United States control

by executive action in 1905 after the Senate had failed to consent to

a treaty for that purpose, 35 the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917,36

Woodrow Wilson's arming of merchantmen in 1917 after Congress
had failed to authorize the same, 37 Franklin D. Roosevelt's exchange
26. One authority wrote many years ago that "popular demand" and general ideas of
necessity are a conventional source of executive authority. Dunning, The Constitution of the
United States in Civil War, I POL. SCI. Q. 163, 174 (1886). Necessity may not increase the
government's power vis-a-vis individuals, however. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 649-53 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
27. See S. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 336-46 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as MORISON]. In his Farewell Address, President Washington said: "it is
our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world."
Quoted by Undersecretary of State Katzenbach, 1967 Hearings72.
28. See generally MORISON 364-67.
29. This executive agreement is discussed in McDougal & Lans, Treaties and
Congressional-Executiveor PresidentialAgreements: InterchangeableInstruments of National
Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 247 n.138 (1945) [hereinafter cited as MacDougal & Lans]. See
generally MORISON 406-07.
30. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT. OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 217-220 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as CORWIN-PRESIDENT]. See generally R. PALMER, A HISTORY OF THE
MODERN WORLD 451-52 (1961).
31. See generally MORISON 558-60.
32. Id. at 579.
33. Moore, Treaties and Executive Agreements, 20 POL. SCI. Q. 385, 391 (1905). The
President's independent power to enter into armistice agreements seems to represent a blend
of his diplomatic and Commander-in-Chief powers. Mathews 353.
34. See generally MORISON 807; R. PALMER, supra note 30, at 655.
35. See generally R. PALMER, supra note 30, at 626.
36. What McDougal and Lans have described as "one of the key instruments in the
formulation of American policy towards Japan" was a "mere executive declaration of
policy." McDougal & Lans 281. See generally CORWIN-PRESIDENT 236, 414.
37. See generally MORISON 859.
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of 50 destroyers for 99-year base leases with the British in 1940,11
his dispatch of troops to Iceland and Greenland 39 and convoys to
Britain in that year,4" his proclamation of the Atlantic"Charter with
42
Winston Churchill in 1941,1 and his conclusion of the Yalta
Potsdam, 4 3 and Teheran -agreements.4 4 What is not certain about

each of these assertions of executive power, in most of which
Congress, happily or not, ultimately acquiesced 45 is whether they
evidence the outer limits of the President's independent powers under
the Constitution, or rather faits accomplis of the executive which the
Congress had no choice but to accept.4 1 It may not be possible to

draw the conceptual line between the two at this time.
It is clear that the Constitution has given the President great

capacity for initiative in foreign affairs4 7 which he has increasingly

exercised. 4 s That such initiative may, notwithstanding the fact that

Congress has been given the power to declare war,49 inevitably
involve the nation in war has been long recognized.50 The President's
38. One authority has stated F.D.R.'s executive action was not only within the independent
powers of the President, but was an "inherently executive power, not subject to Congressional
interference"; that is to say, within the President's exclusive powers. Jones, The President,
Congress, and ForeignRelations, 29 CALIF. L. REv. 565, 580 (1941).
39. The dispatch of troops outside the Western Hemisphere was apparently in contravention
of then existing legislation. Jones 583 n.55; Mathews 382; cf. R. TAFT, A FOREIGN POLICY
FOR AMERICANS 30 (1951).
40. See generally MoRIsoN 999.

41. See generally R. PALMER, supra note 30, at 844.
42. See generally id. at 845-47.
43. See generally id. at 847-48.
44. According to Mathews, the Yalta Agreement "was a valid exercise of the President's
power as Commander-in-Chief." Mathews 358. Many of these episodes, from Washington's
proclamation through these last agreements, are discussed in CORWIN-PRESIDENT.

45. Of course there have been cases where Congress has not acquiesced. Thus Congress
sought to censure President Polk's Mexican initiative in tones reminiscent of recent
congressional strictures over Indo-China. And, Senator Fulbright's hearings and more recent
events certainly reflect considerable unease in some congressional quarters over our recent
adventures in Indo-China. Cf.1967 Hearings.
46. Probably the most clear and dramatic example of executivefait accompli was President
Theodore Roosevelt's dispatch of the fleet around the world, confronting Congress with the
necessity to appropriate funds to bring it back. CORWIN-PRESIDENT 137.

47. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cls. 1-2.
48. In recent decades the President has exercised great initiative in domestic affairs as well.
49. See notes 110-17 infra and accompanying text.
50. Thus, the President's conduct of foreign relations, combined with his responsibility for
the interpretation and execution of treaties, can bring the country close to war. See generally
CORWIN-FOREIGN RELATIONS 97, 129. The President's power as Commander-in-Chief to

command and dispatch troops has always given him the power to bring the nation close to
war. Id. at 131.
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power is now such that his policies-in the war and other foreign
areas-may be all but irresistible by Congress. As enunciated by one

commentator, the Congress has "limited power partly because once
the President makes a public statement of policy the pressure on

Congress to support him is terrific." '5' Certainly it is this interaction
which may explain "the tendency [begun in 1939] on the part of
Congress to whittle away at the powers of the President, particularly

in foreign affairs.

52

Chancellor Kent's suggestion that there is a

"Republican tendency of reducing all executive power," quoted in
Myers v. United States,3 should also be borne in mind."
The Treaty Power
The treaty power 55 is not, to be accurate, a purely presidential
power; rather, it is an independent power shared by the President

and the Senate. 5 However, the shift, early in our history, from
Senate to President in the actual implementation of the treaty power,

is reminiscent of presidential initiative with respect to the foreign
affairs powers and may intimate an inevitability of executive action

in external matters.
Senate participation in the treaty power was one of the
significant changes that the Constitution worked in the area of
foreign affairs-an area previously dominated by the royal
51. 1967 Hearings255 (statement of Prof. W. Stull Holt).
52. Memorandum from Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adviser to Undersecretary of State Ball
(Oct. 1,1964).
53. 272 U.S. 52, 149 (1926).
54. The problem of the expansion of the President's power is to be distinguished,
conceptually, from the impact of such power-expanding possibly because of necessities of war
and not necessarily with respect to affairs abroad-on individual liberties. Examples include
Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the measures taken during World War
II against the Japanese-Americans, CORWIN-PR SIDENT 252, bringing with them overtones

of Locke's prerogative. J.

LOCKE,

Two

TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT

bk. 2, §§ 159-66

(Churchill printing 1690) "nay, 'tis fit that the Laws themselves, should in some Cases, give
way to the Executive Power, or rather to this Fundamental Law of Nature and Government,
viz. That as much as may be, all the Members of the Society are to be preserved." Id. § 159,
at 383.
55. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
56. That the treaty power is a power independent of congressional 'delegation is revealed
by the fact that treaties have often dealt with subjects also entrusted to the Congress.
Commerce has been the principal subject, but captures, definitions of international law, and
other matters over which Congress has power have also been the subject of treaties. The power
to appoint officials, ambassadors and other emissaries, U.S. CONST. art. 11,§ 2, cl.
2, shared
by the President and Senate, is another power independent of Congress.
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executive.57 It was initially thought that the Senate would act as a
sort of executive council, assisting the President in all foreign

matters; certainly it was believed that the Senate would participate'
in treaty-making with the President, from the early stages of a
proposed treaty, at least by consultation if not in actual

negotiation.5 8 Such belief ended early in George Washington's
administration, however, with an episode that has often been related.

President Washington had gone to the Senate expecting to discuss a
proposed Indian treaty, only to be informed that the Senate intended

to consider it alone. Thereupon he vowed that "he would be damned
if he went [to the Senate] again" during negotiations, and no
President has since done so. 59 This shift, at least during the
negotiating stage, has been such that the President has even refused
to disclose information to the Senate during negotiations with a

foreign power, a practice in which the Senate has acquiesced.0
While the "advice" function has thus been formally reduced, the

executive will on occasion informally consult with the Senate on
important treaties, because of its capacity to disapprove treaties or

amend them by "reservations.""1 While the Senate thus apparently
retains its "consent" power, this in turn has been subject
occasionally to the fait accompli pressures inherent in the executive's

capacity to initiate and, indeed, conclude treaty negotiations with or
without informal Senate participation.6 2
57. See Q. WRIGHT, THE CONTROL
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT-FOREIGN

143-46 (1922)
see note 143 infra and accompanying

OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
RELATIONS];

text.

58. In fact, the Senate continued to meet in "executive session" when considering treaties
until the fight over the Versailles Treaty. E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD
ORGANIZATION 34 (1944).
59. Berry, Foreign Policy Making and Congress. I EDITORIAL RESEARCH REP. No. 15
(April 19, 1967).
60. 'CORWIN- PREsIDENT 182-83 &n.41.
61- Cf. Senate representation on some negotiating delegations. See id. at 185.
62. Senator Douglas's testimhony at Hearings on H.R. 9042 Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 85-86- (1965), although in terms addressed to executive

agreements submitted to Congress for ratification, rather than treaties as such, is revealing:
I happened to have been the Senator who cast the deciding vote against the Bricker
amendment, so I think my credentials on the subject are fairly well established. But
the administrative branches of Government, I think, have provoked the Congress and
the Senate very often in entering into agreements with foreign countries not requiring
Senate ratification which are, in effect, treaties, and then after the agreement has been
signed we are placed in the very uncomfortable position that if we disapprove of it, of
the agreement, nevertheless, to refuse to pass the agreement places the administration
and the foreign policy of the country in a very difficult situation. I grant that in many
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The practical role of the Senate has been further reduced by the

emergence of the executive agreement, a development accelerated by
the failure of the Senate to consent to the Treaty of Versailles. 3 The
agreements are of two sorts: those based on the President's

independent foreign affairs powers and those authorized or ratified
by Congress. While the allowable scope of executive agreements is

not clear, they are now widely used. 6 Moreover, the executive
maintains that it may freely decide, without constitutional
inhibition, whether to employ a treaty or an appropriate variety of
executive agreement in a particular case. 5
CONGRESSIONAL POWERS

The Constitution confers many independent powers on the

Congress-broadly divisible into the appropriations power and
certain substantive legislative powers-which have some bearing on
foreign affairs.
The AppropriationsPower

The appropriations powerl 6-which applies to all domestic and
foreign affairs-and its basis, the power to tax,67 are the basic
powers of Congress which together constitute the "power of the
purse."

Denominated the "historic bulwark of legislative

matters the need for speed is great, and that you can't go through the long process of
submitting a treaty to the Senate. But I do say there is a temptation for officers of
Government and particularly for officers of the State Department to try to circumvent
the Senate and present the Congress, as in this instance, with an accomplished fact,
and I hope that the Bricker amendment will not be revived.
But I can only say that actions such as these will strengthen the movement behind
another Bricker amendment.
63. See generally McDougal & Lans.
64. The history of the emergence of the two types of agreements is traced in McDougal &
Lans. A parallel development, although not of such magnitude, has been the President's use
of "secret agents" and other emissaries appointed by him pursuant to his own powers, in lieu
of ambassador -appointed with the consent of the Senate. See CORWIN-PRSIDENT 71, 20607.
65. Letter from Leonard C. Meeker, Acting Legal Advisor to Senator Fulbright, Feb. 24,
1965, reprinted in A. CHAYES, T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS

359 (1968).
66. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl.I ("to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States"); cf id. art. I, § 9, cl.
7 ("No Money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law").
67. U.S. CONSr. art. I § 8, cl.
I. ("Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises").
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authority," 6 the exercise of this power constitutes "the core
legislative process-underpinning all other legislative decisions and
regulating the balance of influence between the legislative and
executive branches of government." 69
While rhetoric sometimes suggests no limit to the power of the
purse, it is, like every other power given by the Constitution, limited:
the power of the purse has been "clipped to the dimensions of a
constitutional right and must accommodate itself to the entire
constitutional scheme." 7 The Supreme Court recognized this in
United States v. Butler,7 where, in striking down the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933 as unconstitutional, the Court stated that
"the power to spend [is] subject to limitations. 7' 2 Similarly in
United States v. Lovett,7 3 the Court invalidated a provision in a
Defense Department appropriations act, barring payments to certain
named persons, characterizing it as a bill of attainder. 4 Both cases
stand for the proposition that the power of appropriations is not
unlimited, but the exact limits of the power, or, indeed, its exact
nature, are unclear. President Monroe thought that "[t]he right of
appropriation is nothing more than a right to apply the public
money to this or that purpose." 5 Although often called the spending
power, this is in fact a misnomer, as it is the executive which spends,
"expenditure . . . [being] primarily an executive function, and
conversely . . . the participation of the legislative branch is
essentially for the purpose simply of setting bounds to executive
discretion-a theory confirmed by early practice under the

Constitution. 176
68. R.

FENNO, THE POWER OF THE PURSE Xiii

(1966). The power is especially relevant to

foreign aid, as opposed to other aspects of foreign affairs, because of the relatively large

amount of "program" (as distinguished from administrative) funds that it has involved.
69. Id.
70. CORWIN-PRESIDENT
71. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).

136.

72. Id. at 66.
73. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
74. Id. at 315-18.
75. Corwin-Spending Power 562. But the President must take care to see the laws are
faithfully executed, which may entail the expenditure of money. And the executive, if only for
the practical reason that it wishes to receive appropriations in subsequent years at comparable
or higher levels, feels pressed to spend by the annual congressional appropriations cycle. This
is revealed in the description of this process and the related executive budget as "action forcing
processes." Hearings on Administration of National Security Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l
Security Staffing and Operations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 88th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. pt. 1,at 106 (1965).
76. CORWIN-PRESIDENT 127-28.
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It was established in the nineteenth century 77 after much

controversy that the appropriations power was distinct from the
substantive legislative powers of Congress found in Article I,

sections 8 and 9 of the Constitution, such as the power to regulate
foreign and interstate commerce. 78 The consequences of the
distinction between the appropriations power and substantive

legislative powers have never been elaborated with respect to foreign
affairs, and the clarity of the distinction remains uncertain today."
In brief, it has been held that while the substantive powers of
Congress give it the power of direction, 80 and regulation, and
jurisdiction, 8 the appropriations power confers no more than the

power to "finance." ' Although thus limited, it may very well be
that the congressional appropriations power draws to itself and is
based in part on substantive powers of Congress as well.
Consequently, the appropriations bills of both House and Senate are

today usually preceded by so-called authorization bills. 3 This is the
case as to foreign aid.8 These bills may contain provisions based on
such substantive powers, as indeed may appropriations legislation,
although limited in this respect by internal rules of the House and
Senate.5

Whatever the appropriation power's precise nature, the essential
77. See Corwin-Spending Power 562.
78. "[T]he power of Congress to authorize expenditures of public moneys for public
purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution."
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936).
79. Arguably, the distinction reached its apogee years ago with respect to domestic affairs.
See generally Corwin-SpendingPower.
80. See note 89 infra. To be sure, the Congress has fewer such substantive powers with
respect to foreign affairs. Cf note 91 infra and accompanying text.
81. Corwin-Spending Power 562.
82. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). Another limit on the appropriations
power, although of no relevance to this article and of possibly little significance today, confines
it to the application of funds "to matters of national as distinguished from local welfare,"
Id. at 67. It might be noted that as long ago as 1806 the Congress believed its powers ample
enough to include "foreign aid" and appropriated $50,000 for the "wretched sufferers" of
an earthquake in Caracas, Venezuela. Corwin-SpendingPower 560.
83. United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554 (1940), makes the distinction between such
"authorization" and "appropriations" legislation.
84. There are in fact annual authorization and appropriations acts which have given rise
to what Senator Fulbright has called the "annual jeopardy" of aid.
85. Senate Rule XVI,
I and House Rule XXI,
2, set out at Hearings on Separation
of Powers Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Separation of
Powers].
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power that it gives Congress is, paradoxically, the power to withhold
appropriations upon which the executive is dependent. "The

authority of the Congress to make appropriations, within the
framework of the Constitution, is plenary. The power to make
appropriations carries with it the power to withhold or deny
appropriations. That power has been exercised for generations. This
is as fundamental as the Ten Commandments." 6 Although this

position has not gone unchallenged,8 7 it may be accepted for
purposes of discussion. A question remains, however, as to the extent
to which the "power to withhold or deny" appropriations entirely
includes the lesser powers to prescribe conditions, limits, and the like
on appropriations that are granted.
"Substantive" Powersof Congress
Program Powers. While the executive and other branches of

government could not function very long without appropriations, it
is also true that the domestic programs of the executive could not

exist without the exercise of Congress's "program" power and the
delegation of substantive power by the Congress:
The determination of the functions and activities which the government shall
carry on within the Constitution is a legislative matter and therefore the
President as general manager has no authority or power to determine
functions or activities, except in so far as those powers are especially
conferred upon him by the provisions of the Constitution . . . or by the
delegation of administrative discretion to him by legislative action. s

Congress can also specify the detail of such programs and direct
their execution to the extent that it chooses to do so," although there
86. Lovett v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 142, 149 (Ct. Cl. 1945) (concurring opinion), affd
on other giounds, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). The concurring opinion reiterated that "[t]he Congress
has the sheer power to grant or withhold current appropriations .
Id.
87. See note 198 infra and accompanying text.
88. L. MERIAM & L. SCHMECKEBREIR, REORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT:
WHAT DOES IT INVOLVE? 125 (1939). Such delegations of authority have been called the

Congress's "program" power, id., and might be distinguished from other legislative
enactments such as criminal laws. As previously noted the executive has few independent
substantive powers in the domestic area. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.

89. It has been suggested that, with respect to domestic matters, as distinguished from
foreign and military matters, legislation can be written with any conditions the Congress
wishes and with any degree of specificity. Memorandum of Eli Noblemen, Senate Committee
on Expenditures in the Executive Departments (Nov. 29, 1951), reprinted in, H.R. REP. No.
2456, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1962); see CORWIN-PREIDENT 120; cf. United States v. Klein,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 519, 523 (1871) (congressional control over delegated powers is limited
only by "self-restraint"); Hearings on Separation of Powers 134 (Congress could "write
infinite detail into legislation"), 248 (Prof. Bickel). See generally J. HART, THE ORDINANCE
MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 1952.
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are practical limits on the power of Congress to so specify. Thus, it

is usually impossible to draft legislation with sufficient specificity to
cover every contingency, with the result that discretion must be left
to the executive. 0

Congress has substantive legislative powers with respect to
certain areas of foreign affairs,9' including such matters as trade,92
90. Freund suggested there is an irreducible executive discretion-unstandardized
power-which he has described as "that residuum of government otherwise subject to law
which cannot be reduced to rule." Freund, The Substitution of Rule for Discretion in Public
Law, 9 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 666, 670 (1915). This may be no more than a restatement of the
drafting difficulties already averted to.
Another limitation on the power of the Congress to see that all its wishes are enforced arises
from the sheer multiplicity of legislation. When it is realized that the amount of enacted
legislation is vast and not always wholly consistent, the President, in taking care that "the
laws be faithfully executed," will inevitably have to exercise discretion in picking and choosing
among the statutes he will implement and the manner in which he will do so. See Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 700 (1952) (Vinson, J., dissenting); Grundstein,
Presidential Power, Administration and Administrative Law, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 285,
291 (1950). Finally, the President may not enforce laws which violate a specific injunction of
the Constitution, for example, the fourteenth amendment. Kranz, A 20th Century
Emancipation Proclamation:PresidentialPower Permits Withholding of Federal Funds from
Segregated Institutions, II AM. U.L. REV. 48 (1962); Miller, PresidentialPower to Impound
Appropriated Funds: An Exercise in Constitutional Decision Making, 43 N.C.L. REV. 502
(1965).
Beyond these practical and other limits on the power of the Congress to direct the executive,
is there a core area of substantive decisions with respect to domestic affairs that cannot be
controlled by Congress? While some language of the courts, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(I Cranch) 137 (1803), Attorneys General, e.g., Caleb Cushing, 7 Op. ATr'y GEN. 186, (1855),
and other executive officials, e.g., Deputy Director Hughes of the Bureau of the Budget,
Hearings on Separation of Powers 144, and writers, e.g., CORWIN-PRESIDENT 81, may
suggest there is, this is not established.
Such a doubtful proposition is not to be confused with another. Where legislation leaves
discretion to the executive, as it almost invariably does, the exercise of such discretion is
normally not subject to injunction. lMississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867);
Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 610 (1840). But cf. P. De Ronde & Co. v. United States
Sugar Equalization Bd., 299 F. 659 (D. Del. 1924), affd, 7 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1925)
(discretionary language regarding conferral of benefit on individuals construed as mandatory).
A final point may be noted. It has often been maintained that legislation should be
-general," with its application to specific instances left to the executive. Possibly it is
legislation applicable to the public, such as criminal legislation, rather than that applicable
to the executive that is contemplated by persons maintaining this position. In any eyent, this
ideal has not been reflected in constitutional limitation on the exercise of Congress's
substantive or program powers delegating authority to the executive in the domestic area.
91. Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign
Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 903 (1959).
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress has power "[tlo regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations.
...).

FOREIGN AID

Vol. 1970: 293]

tariffs,93 immigration,94 passports, 5 and neutrality,96 derived wholly

or in part from its power to regulate foreign commerce.

7

However,

as will be shown there is a large range of foreign affairs-the "core

area" of decisions 9 -over

which Congress does not have substantive

or program powers. Even the commerce-related substantive powers
that Congress has may yield, in part, to Presidential power over a
"core area" of foreign commerce. 9
Powers Over Administrative Detail. Related to the congressional

power to create programs is the power to specify many matters of
administrative detail. These run the gamut from the establishment

of agencies, offices, and positions,' 0 through the control of many

personnel matters,10 to the disposition of property 0 2 and the
specification of operating procedures.' 0 3 Thus, it would appear that

Congress's discretion is virtually unlimited in "prescribing the
organization, procedure and business practices of an administrative

agency";

04

although, as a practical matter, congressional control

93. The power to impose tariffs is based on the commerce power and the power to lay taxes.
Id. cl. l;see Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
94. U.S. CONs.T. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
95. Id. (Commerce Clause); see Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 518 (1964).
96. Neutrality legislation "regulating" commerce in the face of foreign wars is based on
the commerce power and the power to declare war. See Garner, Executive Discretion in the
Conduct of Foreign Relations, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 289 (1937); Garner, The United States
Neutrality Act of 1937, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 385 (1937).
Other powers of Congress include various military and war powers, see note 110 infra. and
its "money" powers, e.g., U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 2, 5; McDougal & Lans 586-88.
See also, e.g., powers to "define . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations," Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957, 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10,
and to "make Rules concerning Captures," id. cl. 11.
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
98. See notes 149-215 infra and accompanying text.
99. The possibility that the executive has exclusive powers even in the area of commerce is
discussed at notes 139.48 infra and accompanying text. The existence of an independent treaty
power over commerce has already been averted to. See note 56 supra.
100. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("Officers . . . which shall be established by Law")
and id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("Necessary and proper" Clause); CORWIN-PRESIDENT 70.
101. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("Congress may by law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper.
...).
102. This authority has a special constitutional basis. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
103. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("Necessary and proper" clause).
104. L. MERIAM & L. SCHNIECKEBREIR, supra note 88, at 125. This kind of administrative
detail, which may be common to both domestic and foreign programs, is to be distinguished
from the "detail" of conduct and policy, which forms part of the core area of foreign affairs
that is immune from congressional control. See note 187 infra and accompanying text. It is
also to be distinguished from detailed financial terms to which appropriations may be subject.
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over administration is limited by the President's removal power-a
power extending to both domestic and foreign affairs. 05

The extensiveness of these powers in the area of foreign affairs
is not well defined." 6 Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that
notwithstanding Congress's power to establish offices, the President

also has asserted an independent power to do so and has created
domestic commissions and offices'07 as well as diplomatic ones." 8

Indeed, prior to 1855 he created all ambassadorial positions without
benefit of specific legislation.' 0'
The Power to Declare War. It has been suggested that making

the Congress the locus of the power to declare war"10-along

with

giving the Senate a share in the treaty power-represents the

principal innovation of the Constitution with respect to foreign
affairs."' President Lincoln stated the reason for this innovation:
Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars
. . . . This our convention understood to be the most oppressive of all kingly
that no man
oppressions, and they resolved to so frame the Constitution
2
should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us."
105. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). One authority has suggested
that the removal power plus other powers of the President not subject to congressional control,
whether as a constitutional or practical matter, give him the power of "unitary management"
over the executive branch. See Grundstein, supra note 90, at 287. Whether this is so may be
subject to some question. W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 204 (4th ed. 1960);
cf. CORWIN-PRESIDENT 81.
106. See notes 126-27 infra and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., CORWIN-PRESIDENT 71-72 &n.7.
108. See note 64 supra.
109. According to Senator Bibb such offices were "the offspring of the state of our
relations with foreign nations, and must necessarily be governed by . . . rules [distinct from
those that govern 'the internal system']." CORWIN-FOREGN RELATIONS 53. Until 1855
Congress merely appropriated a lump sum for "the expenses of foreign intercourse."
CORWIN-PRESIDENT 205. Again in the words of Senator Bibb: "Congress has always
appropriated a gross sum for foreign intercourse, leaving the President to select the powers
with whom we should be represented, unrestrained, except by the amount of the
appropriation." CORWIN-FOREIGN RELATIONS 54; cf 7 Op. Ai-r'Y GEN. 186, 217 (1855).
Since 1855 Congress has enacted increasingly detailed legislation with respect to grades,
qualifications of foreign service officers, and other aspects of administrative detail. See Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Today there is a large body of legislation on the matter.
Foreign Service Act of 1946, 22 U.S.C. § 801 (1964). It may indeed be said that the President
has "lost" some power in this area insofar as congressional control has been accepted.
CORWIN-FOREIGN RELATIONS 66; CORWIN- PRESIDENT 206. In the United Kingdom the
creation of offices is still largely a matter of executive power. CORWIN-PRESIDENT 69.
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. The Constitution also contains other provisions dealing
especially with the military and war powers, including art. 1, § 8, cls. 11-16 and art. Ii, § 2,
cl. 1.
I11. WRIGHT-FOREIGN RELATIONS 101, 125, 227, 252, 258, 284, 344, 368. But cf. Id. at
362.
112. TAFT 29-30.
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It is arguable, however, how real the possibility of a formal

congressional declaration of war remains. As previously noted," 3 the
President has the power, as chief diplomatist and Commander-in-

Chief, to make war all but inevitable. The implications of total war
in a formal declaration of war, issued in an era of limited warfare,

must be considered."' President Nixon may have been correct when,
as a private citizen, he said that "there will never be another
declaration of war . . . that time is gone."' 15 It is a matter of

historic record that even in earlier eras the President in fact initiated,
or strongly influenced the initiation of, all formal congressional
declarations of war. "' The considerations of democratic political
of
philosophy reflected in the notion of the congressional declaration
1 7

war remain, however, and to these we shall briefly return later. '

The Treaty Power. The other principal innovation of the
Constitution with respect to foreign affairs, the treaty power, has

been discussed above,"t8 and the erosion of the Senate's share in it
noted. "' The treaty power is continually cited as a basis for Senate

participation in foreign affairs.Y0

THE RELATIONSHIP OF EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL POWERS
WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS: THE TRADITIONAL CORE AREA

To determine the nuances of what is "executive" and what is
"legislative" power under the Constitution, one must look not to
theories of "separation of powers," but rather to the continuing

development of accommodations between the executive and the
Congress. Given independent powers in the President and Congress,

at least three possible relations between such powers suggest
113. See note 50supra.
114. 1967 Hearings 161-62.

115. Interview with Richard M. Nixon, WETA-TV, Washington, D.C., Nov. 27, 1967.
116. Garner, Executive Discretion in the Conduct of Foreign Relations, 31 AM. J. INT'L

L. 289, 292 &n.9 (1937).
117. See Part II of this article.
118. See notes 55-65 supra and accompanying text. Secretary of State Hay thought the
innovation, giving a relatively small number of men the power to frustrate the executive's
foreign policy, the "irreparable mistake of the Constitutional Convention." McDougal & Lans
556 n.105. The shift from treaties to executive agreements has probably repaired the
"mistake." See note 64 supra and accompanying text. The appointment power may also be
noted as an innovation. See notes 100-02 supra and accompanying text.
119. See notes 57-60 supra and accompanying text. The protection of states' interests
sought to be achieved by Senate participation in the treaty power will be considered in Part
II of this article.
120. See Part IIof this article.
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themselves: (1)congressional control over executive power;", (2) "a
zone of twilight in which [the President] and Congress may have
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain";'
and (3) "presidential control . . . [where] the Congress [is disabled

by the courts] from acting upon the subject.'

23

Executive Power Subject to Congressional Control; Congressional
Faits Accomplis
Independent executive power can only be subject to congressional
control if the Congress in turn has independent powers. We have
seen that although such congressional powers are limited with
respect to foreign affairs, they exist to some undetermined extent
with respect to administrative detail and foreign commerce; and it
is in these areas that, to an extent probably less than the outer limits
of Congress's independent powers, congressional legislation may
control the executive. Thus, the Attorney General acknowledged that
legislation with respect to the disposition of property somewhat
limited President Roosevelt in the proposed exchange in 1940 of 50
destroyers and other property for 99-year leases to British bases. 24
So too, notwithstanding the President's powers as Commander-inChief, the Congress may prescribe rules for the payment of sailors.'
We have seen that the President not only appoints ambassadors
and other emissaries, but that until 1855 he was deemed to create
their offices. 26 Although he seems to have "lost" some of these
powers, the President still determines when and where to dispatch
emissaries, what their rank shall be, and the size of American
embassies. 27
121. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952); cf. United
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170
(1804). These cases indicate that the President has certain independent powers in the absence

of legislation to the contrary and suggest that such powers may yield to such contrary
legislation.
122. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).

123. Id. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also id. at 597 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). "There has been no dispute that the President has certain constitutional powers
not subject to the will of Congress or the Senate." Matthews 349.

124. Statutes barred the President from transferring certain mosquito boats. 39 Op.ArT'y
GEN. 484, 496 (1940). The provision of funds and services under foreign aid is rarely deemed
to involve this disposition of property power.
125. United States v. Symonds, 120 U.S. 46 (1887).
126. See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
127. See A. CHAYES, T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENFELD, supra note 65, at 368, question 4(b);
see note 109 supra; cf.Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
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Certain exercises of Congress's constitutional powers, for
example, the commerce power, may control the executive. This
situation is to be distinguished from that where Congress passes laws
which it may lack the constitutional authority to pass, but to which
the executive adheres inadvertently or for want of practical power to
do otherwise. There are, arguably, a number of illustrations of this,
a prominent one being the executive's compliance with many of the
present restrictions in the foreign aid legislation, which this article
maintains are unconstitutional. Occasionally such congressional
faits accomplis are ignored, as, for example, in President Andrew
Johnson's refusal to comply with the 1867 Tenure of Office Act, an

Act which in retrospect seems clearly unconstitutional,' 18 which
almost brought about the President's impeachment .1 9 Professor
McDougal has said of one such possible congressionalfait accompli,
Moreover, if the subject of the agreement is a matter within the President's
special constitutional competence-related, 'for example, to the recognition of
a foreign government or to an exercise of his authority as Commander-inChief-a realistic application of the separation of powers doctrine might in
some situations appropriately permit the President to disregard the statute as
an unconstitutional invasion of his own power.13
128. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 167 (1926).
129. Another example is the Act of March 4, 1913, 22 U.S.C. § 1262 (1964), which
provides: "The Executive shall not extend or accept any invitation to participate in any
international congress, conference, or like event, without first having specific authority of law
to do so." The President has of course ignored this statute on many occasions, including the
Versailles Peace Conference. It has been said to be "an unconstitutional interference with the
President's prerogatives. Since the United States participates in approximately three hundred
international conferences each year, it is difficult to determine the extent to which attention
has been paid to the act in recent years." Nobleman 155. See note 11 supra. It may not be
clear to a President that the law that he proposes to ignore is unconstitutional-and possibly
it does not matter to him. In this connection, it is interesting to note some views of President
Roosevelt, stated in 1942, anticipating the possible failure of Congress to repeal certain
legislation which he believed inhibited his wartime powers:
In the event that the Congress should fail to act, and act adequately, I shall accept the
responsibility and I will act .

. .

. The responsibilities of the President in wartime to

protect the Nation are very grave. This total war, with our fighting fronts all over the
world, makes the use of Executive power far more essential than in any previous war
*
I cannot tell what powers may have to be exercised in order to win this war.
HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., IST SESS.,

AND PROCLAMATIONS: A STUDY OF A USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 15,
1957); see CORWIN-PRESIDENT 250-51. And compare Professor Harold

EXECUTIVE ORDERS

n.81 (Comm. Print.
Laski's remark that
no democracy can "afford a scheme of government the basis of which is the inherent right of
the legislature to paralyze the executive power." H. LASKI, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 163

(1940).
130. McDougal & Lans 317.
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The Twilight Zone: Concurrent Powers; Uncertain Distribution of
Powers

Concurrent Powers. The President and the Senate, pursuant to
independent powers such as the treaty, 13' appointment,'

diplomatic, 133 and Commander-in-Chief powers,' 3' may incur
financial obligations. If such obligations pertain to the core area,35
presumably Congress is unable to limit the power to incur them.

Nevertheless, it is established that Congress is under no legal3
obligation to appropriate funds to satisfy these obligations;'
similarly, it cannot be bound to exercise other independent powers
such as the taxing power. 3 7 To be sure the President can, as we have

seen, confront Congress with faits accomplis which, as a practical
matter, give little choice but to appropriate, a dramatic example
being Theodore Roosevelt's dispatch of the fleet halfway around the
3
world and his subsequent request to Congress to bring it back.' 1

Uncertain Distribution. An

example

of

powers

whose

distribution might be considered "uncertain" are some of those
concerning foreign commerce. The Constitution gives Congress the
power to regulate such commerce. 3 1 On the other hand, we have

noted that the treaty power extends to the subject'40 and that the
President himself has independent powers with respect to it. United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,' the most explicit
131.
132.
133.
134.
during

See notes 55-65 supra and accompanying text.
CORWIN-FOREIGN RELATIONS 68; 7 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 186, 209 (1855).
See note 109 supra.
For example, an obligation of two million dollars was incurred by President Lincoln
the Civil War without prior congressional authorization or appropriation. See L.

WILMERDING, THE SPENDING POWER: A HISTORY OF THE EFFORTS OF CONGRESS TO

CONTROL EXPENDITURES 14 (1943). See also CORWIN-PRESIDENT 119-69 & n.44.
135. See notes 151-192 infra and accompanying text.
136. But cf.note 198 infra.
137. Cf. Letter from Leonard C. Meeker to Senator J.William Fulbright, Feb. 24, 1965
(reprinted in A. CHAYES, T. ERLICH & A. LOWENFELD, 'INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS at
359 (1968)).
138. See note 46 supra. The President in the past often incurred obligations under his
military powers although there had been no prior appropriations. See generally L.
WILMERDING supra note 134, at 77-98.
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
140. See note 56 supra.
141. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The executive has justified its participation in the international
antidumping code as "pursuant to the President's constitutional authority to conduct foreign
relations-and not under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 or any other piece of legislation."
Hearings on the InternationalAntidumping Code Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1968).
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declaration of independent executive powers in foreign affairs, dealt

with an embargo, in part at least a matter of foreign commerce.'
It has probably never been possible to keep matters of commerce
entirely separate from diplomatic and military matters;113 certainly

the two often blend today.'
Discussions at the Constitutional Convention apparently
contemplated that the operations of the related export clause4
would yield to the war powers of the President.' It also seems clear
that the President's exclusive powers of negotiation extend to the

commerce area and that only the executive negotiates trade
agreements and treaties.4

7

Whether there is an area of substantive

142. The power to impose embargoes may also derive in part from Commander-in-Chief
and diplomatic powers, as well as the commerce power. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc.,
204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), affd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955), may raise some
question about the existence of independent foreign commerce powers in the President. The
court of appeals held that the President could not enter into an effective executive agreement
with respect to the import of potatoes from Canada not previously authorized by-and indeed
apparently inconsistent with-prior congressional legislation. The Supreme Court, in
affirming the judgment, did not reach the ground on which the court of appeals affirmed the
district court's decision. See generally Sutherland, The Bricker Amendment, Executive
Agreements and Imported Potatoes, 67 HARV. L. RaV. 281, 288 (1953). It is significant that
the Supreme Court reached the same result as the district court, which assumed the President

had the power to make an effective agreement. 348 U.S. at 300. The Court of Claims in South
Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v. United States, 334 F.2d 622, 634 n.16 (Ct. Cl. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965), suggested that the Supreme Court had thus "neutralized"
the court of appeals. To be sure, the agreement may very well not have dealt with a matter
of such foreign policy importance as to quality for the core area. See notes 151-91 infra and
accompanying text.
143. It should be noted, however, that at the time of the 1787 Constitutional Convention
the foreign affairs activities of the British executive and the parliamentary control of
commerce were distinct. WRIGHT-FOREIGN RELATIONS 143 n.25.
144. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 110 (1948)
("Legislative and Executive powers are pooled obviously to the end that commercial, strategic,
and diplomatic interests of the country may be coordinated .
); South Puerto Rico
Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v. United States, 334 F.2d 622 (Ct. Cl. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
964 (1965); Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 275 F.2d 472 (C.C.P.A. 1959); cf. the
"regulation" of commerce by neutrality legislation versus President's determination of
neutrality, note 96 supra and accompanying text.
145. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 2.
146. Note, Constitutionalityof Export Controls, 76 YALE L.J. 200, 208 (1966), citing 2 M.
FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 361-62 (1937).
147. A. CHAYES, T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENFELD, supra note 65, at 307 et seq. (discussing
the 1965 United States-Canadian Automotive Products Agreement). The fact that Congress
has powers in the area of commerce that it does not have elsewhere is reflected in the Trade

Expansion Act of 1962, § 243, 19 U.S.C. § 1873 (1964) which provides for the inclusion of
Senators and Congressmen in trade agreement negotiation delegations.
The relationship of treaties and congressional statutes, a much discussed matter, has only
a tangential bearing on the subject of this article. It is held that under the United States
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foreign commerce decisions over which the President has exclusive
powers is not clear, and it may be that matters deemed to fall under

touching on commerce,
the President's exclusive powers, although
48
would not be characterized as such.

Exclusive Executive Powers Not Subject to Congressional Control:
The TraditionalCore Area
That the President has certain "plenary and exclusive
power[s]' 49 over foreign affairs is accepted.' 0 The exact substantive

area of decisions subject to such exclusive powers and the exact
nature of congressional control from which such area is free, require
some exploration.
The Substantive Area of Decisions. The area of substantive

foreign affairs decisions traditionally considered free of
congressional control-the traditional core area-consists of a wide
range of diplomatic functions and those functions of the
Commander-in-Chief power as have foreign affairs importance.,5
2 (the Supremacy Clause) the latter in time of a treaty or statute
Constitution, art. VI, cl.
will prevail if such a congressional purpose is clearly expressed. Cook v. United States, 288
U.S. 102, 120 (1933); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 145 (1965).
However, the courts have stated explicitly that later legislation will prevail over a treaty only
if the legislation is "within the powers of Congress." Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598
(1884); Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784 (No. 13,799) (C.C.D. Mass. 1855), affd, 67 U.S.
(2 Black) 481 (1862). Thus, the "later in time" principle does not bear on the core area which
this article maintains to be immune from congressional control. See notes 151-91 infra and
accompanying text. Compare the relationship of congressional legislation and a subsequent
executive agreement which is normally said not to prevail. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 144 (1965); see RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 147, comment b (Proposed Official Draft, May 3, 1962); see also Watts v. United
States, I Wash. Terr. 288 (1870). In Watts the court refused to find invalid an executive
agreement which was inconsistent with prior legislation. The executive agreement appeared to
be based in part on the Commander-in-Chief and diplomatic powers. However, the court's
forbearance may be explained on grounds of the political question doctrine.
148. See the discussion of United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc. at note 142 supra, and
questions of neutrality at note 96 supra.
149. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). ("the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
).
...
government in the field of international relations.
150. Many cases assume the President has exclusive powers over foreign affairs. See, e.g.,
Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr,
243 F. Supp. 957, 973-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); cf. the dicta of Justices Jackson ("a President
whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled"), Youngstown Sheet &Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952), and Frankfurter ("his vast share of responsibility for
the conduct of our foreign relations"), id. at 610.
151. There are many Commander-in-Chief functions with foreign affairs importance,
including problems of status of forces, and armistices, see note 33 supra and accompanying
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Among the principal exclusive powers of the Preiident is the
power to recognize foreign governments and states: "The authority

to extend recognition to states and to governments is included in the
power of the President to conduct the foreign relations of the United
States.''15 This is no mere mechanical power. "[It] . . .is not
limited to a determination of the government to be recognized. It
includes the power to determine the policy which is to govern the
question of recognition."' ' 3 While it has sometimes been suggested
that the executive is to be guided by considerations of international

law in deciding whether or not to withhold recognition, this has
meant little in actual practice.

54

A colloquy between then

Undersecretary of State Katzenbach and Senator Mundt leaves little
doubt that executive discretion in this area is free of congressional

control.
Undersecretary Katzenbach: Or to take another example, there are
obviously commitments of the Nation, national commitments, involved in the
recognition of a foreign state or the recognition of a foreign government
..

.

.These are matters which traditionally have been exclusively Executive.

Senator Mundt:. . . I think there has never been, certainly recently, any
effort on the part of Congress to deny or inhibit or curtail in any way those

decisions ....

Many episodes make clear that Congress can neither direct the

executive to recognize a government nor prevent it from doing so.,"
text. Moreover, the Commander-in-Chief function generally provides a useful analogy for
analysis of the foreign affairs functions. It does so in part because it often involves the
collective interests of the nation in the international order, as does the diplomatic function.
This analysis is further considered in Part II.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW § 106(2) (1965); see United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229, 240-41 (1942). See also The Maret, 145 F.2d 431 (3d Cir.
1944) (-Nonrecognition of a foreign sovereign . .. is]as essential a part of the power
confided by the Constitution to the Exacutive for the conduct of foreign affairs as
recognition."). The President also has the power to recognize insurgency, belligerency, and the'
like. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863); Wright, The Power to Declare
Neutrality under American Laws, 34 Am.J. INT'L L. 302, 309 (1940) (quoting John Quincy
Adams, as Secretary of State, Jan. 1, 1819).
153. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942).
154. President Wilson, for example, avowed his intention to utilize the power to achieve
political ends and it has been stated that "the downfall of Huerta [in 1915] was due directly
to President Wilson's refusal to recognize him as the defacto government of Mexico."
CORWIN-FoREIGN RELATIONS 83.

155. 1967 Hearings 148. And Mr. Garner has written, "In this connection reference may
be made to the power of the President in respect to the recognition of foreign states,
governments and belligerent powers-a full and completely uncontrolled discretion." Garner,
supra note 116, at 291.
156. There are several historic episodes involving congressional efforts to direct the
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An illustration of the latter occurred in 1864 when Congress resolved
that it was inappropriate for the government to continue to recognize
Maximilian's government in Mexico. Secretary of State Seward,
however, informed the French Government that "this is a . . .
purely Executive question, and the decision of it constitutionally
belongs.

. .

to the President ... "I"

Closely related to the power of recognition is the power' to
commence, maintain, and sever' diplomatic relations. The power is
exclusively the President's; the Congress cannot prevent such
relations or the sending of diplomatic representatives. Thus, in 1876,
President, Grant successfully protested against inclusion in the
Diplomatic Appropriations Act of a directive that he notify certain
diplomatic and consular officers to "close their offices."' 60 An effort
to delete funds for a minister to Mexico in 1842 had been defeated
for similar reasons, it being noted by Congressman Pickens that the
"Executive.

.

.was constitutionally charged with [the matter]."

Again, in 1940, there were congressionally-initiated attempts to
sever diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union by withholding
funds for the United States ambassador and the American Embassy
in Moscow. Both attempts were defeated. During the course of
debate, Congressman McCormack, who made the initial proposal,
stated: "True, the question of diplomatic relationship in itself rests
with the executive branch of the Government, but under the
Constitution we have the power of expressing our own views as a
0 2
body when appropriation bills are under consideration."''
Congressman Celler replied: "If such a motion as the gentleman
President to recognize a government. All were defeated. Principal attempts include Henry

Clay's effort to have the government recognize Argentina in 1818, and the efforts to recognize
an independent Texas in 1832 and an independent Cuba in 1897. Nobleman 150-52;
CORWIN-PRESIDENT 186-90.

157.

CORWIN-FOREIGN RELATIONS

42.

158. This power, like the recognition power, is sometimes said to derive technically from
the power to receive and dispatch ambassadors and other emissaries; cf text at note 17 supra.
159. It has been suggested that President Wilson's severance of diplomatic relations with
Germany on February 3, 1917, made the United States' entry into World War I all but
inevitable. J. BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIvE IN THE UNITED STATES 32 & n,37
(1920); cf withdrawal of ambassadors from Germany and Italy by President Roosevelt prior
to our entry into World War II. McDougal & Lans 604. A congressional declaration of war
would of course lead to a severance of relations. In practice, however, this latter step is usually
taken by the executive well before war commenceq, and in any case the executive usually
controls the declaration of war as well. See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
160. CORWIN-PRESIDENT Ch. VI, n.46.
161. Nobleman 151-52.
162. Id. at 157.
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from Massachusetts presents could prevail, then what would be the
use of a State Department? Let the Appropriation Committee carry

on our foreign affairs."'
Nor can Congress direct that such relations be commenced""4 or
specify the ranks of our representatives.' The President, in effect,

has exclusive power to control and make policy with respect to the
existence of our relations with foreign governments.
The President also has the exclusive power to decide the content

and mode of our relations with foreign countries and to conduct the
same. Thus, he alone decides whether or not to undertake

negotiations, whether it be of a treaty or an executive agreement.,"
The remarks of Benjamin Curtis, a former Associate Justice of the

Supreme Court, in defense of President Andrew Johnson at his trial
for impeachment, are revealing:
Suppose a law should provide that the President of the United States should

not make a treaty with England or with any other country? It would be a
plain infraction of his constitutional power, and if an occasion arose when
such a treaty was in his judgment expedient and necessary it would be his
duty to make it; and the fact that it should be declared to be a high
misdemeanor if he made it would no more relieve him from the responsibility
of acting through the fear of that law than he would be relieved of that
responsibility by a bribe not to act. 67

The President has sole power to determine whether or not an
agreement or treaty should be finally concluded, even though the
Senate has already ratified it.16s And, while the law with respect to

the termination of treaties is in a "somewhat confused state,""

it

seems clear that the Congress cannot direct the President to

terminate one.7 0
163. Id.
164. McDougal & Lans 604.
165. 7 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 186, 217 (1855).
166. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307 (1829); CORWIN-PRESIDENT 211-12.

We have seen that the President has freedom to decide which it will be. See note 65 supra
and accompanying text. Of course a treaty, to be effective, requires Senate consent, and certain
executive agreements require congressional legislation.
167. P. FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND, M. HOWE & E. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 19
(1954). Similarly, the President decides whether or not the government will be represented at
a conference, which may be thought of as no more than the occasion for discussion or
negotiations. See note 129 supra.
168. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307 (1829); CORWIN-PREsIDENT 211-12.
169. 5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 330 (1943).
170. President Wilson refused to terminate certain treaties although directed to do so-by
the Merchant Marine (Jones) Act of 1920, § 34, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920); see McDougal &
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The executive alone transacts the nation's day-to-day foreign
affairs. Thomas Jefferson, then Secretary of State, stated that the

"transaction of business with foreign nations is Executive
altogether. 1 7' It is the executive which receives and dispatches

emissaries 72 and communicates with other nations. As stated by
John Marshall: "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign

nations."'

73

Moreover, the President "alone negotiates."'7

Thus, in

Curtiss-Wright the Supreme Court noted that "into the field of

negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is
powerless to invade it," a fact equally true of treaties and executive
agreements. 7 5 It is the President who makes protests

7

and espouses

Lans 347; Reeves, The Jones Act and the Denunciation of Treaties, 15 At. J. INT'L L. 33,
36 (1921). Interestingly, the treaties were in the commerce area, perhaps suggesting that the
President has asserted a right not to terminate agreements which do not otherwise fall within
the core area. If the agreement deals with the core area it seems clear that Congress cannot
direct its termination. So, President Lincoln and his Secretary of State, Seward, ignored
congressional directions to terminate the Rush-Bagot agreement (an executive agreement).
McDougal & Lans 337 n.131 & 346-47. See Reeves, supra, at 35-36. Speaking of this episode
McDougal and Lans suggest that an agreement will not be terminated by a statute if it
"invades the President's independent constitutional powers." McDougal & Lans 346; cf id.
at 338. Of course a President may choose to comply with a direction to terminate a treaty,
Van der Weyde v. Ocean Transport Co., 297 U.S. 114 (1936).
171. He stated more fully: "The transaction of businesss with foreign nations is Executive
altogether. It belongs, then, to the head of that department except as to such portions of it as
are specially submitted to the Senate. Exceptions are to be construed strictly." 3 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 16 (Definitive ed. 1907).
172. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
173. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); cf Chicago
& S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948); United States
v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1924);
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 64 (A.
Hamilton) and 75 (J. Jay).
174. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
175. Id. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported to the Senate on February 15,
1816, that "the interference of the Senate in the'direction of foreign negotiations [was]
calculated to diminish [the] . . .responsibility [of the President to the Constitution as sole
organ] and thereby to impair the best security for the national safety.
...
United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). And Congress is without power
to give the executive instructions as to negotiations. See note 206 infra. The immunity of the
negotiating process is such that the President need not divulge information with respect to
pending negotiations either to the House of Representatives, United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., supra, or to his partner in the treaty power, the Senate, CORWIN-PRESIDENT
182 & n.41. Although the Senate does not participate in the negotiation of treaties, "the
President occasionally does include individual Senators in the negotiation stages." C. Zinn,
The Role of the Congress in Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1967 (paper prepared for the United States
Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union). Thus Senators have been included in United States
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and settles claims on behalf of United States nationals. The "power
to remove such obstacles to full recognition as settlement of claims

of our nationals certainly is a modest implied power of the President
who is the 'sole organ of the federal government in the field of

international relations.'

"17

The President also decides upon

reprisals,' 7 8 actions which may involve the exercise of the

Commander-in-Chief function.7

80
Notwithstanding the administrative detail powers of Congress,
at least the State Department, if not other executive agencies

concerned with foreign affairs,'

has avoided much congressional

control: "It is the department which from the beginning the Senate

has never assumed the right to control or direct, except as to clearly
defined matters relating to duties imposed by Statute and not

connected with the conduct of foreign affairs.'18 Professor Berdahl
adds: "The Department of State has generally been recognized as
. . . being more directly subject to the control of the President than
any other department.' 83 A principal consequence of this special
status has been a freedom of control with respect to the disclosure

of information.

4

delegations to negotiate such important treaties as the Bretton Woods Agreement and the Act
of Chapultepec, McDougal & Lans 553 & n.94; the United Nations Charter, Zinn, supra at
5; and the Japanese Peace Treaty, M. JEWELL, SENATORIAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY
136 (1962).
176. WRIGHT-FoREIGN RELATIONS 264. But cf. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1964) ("the President
shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen 'unjustly deprived of his liberty' by a
foreign government").
177. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942). "That the President's control of
foreign relations includes the settlement of claims is indisputable." Id. at 240 (Frankfurther,
J., concurring); cf. La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 (1899)
(disposition of proceeds).
178. WRIGHT-FOREIGN RELATIONS 294; McDougal & Lans 604; cf. Mathews 110 (recall
of ambassador as form of retaliation).
179. The extent to which reprisals, involving force, remain lawfully available to a state
under the United Nations Charter is problematical. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PROBLEMS 413 (1968).
180. See notes 100-05 supra and accompanying text.
181. "The statutory authority of the State Department and that of the other departments
and agencies in the conduct of foreign affairs is markedly different. The role of the State
Department has never been prescribed by the Congress." COMM'N ON THE ORG. OF THE
ExEcUTIvE BRANCH OF THE Gov'T; TASK FORCE REPORT ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 57 (1949);
cf. FAA § 622(a) ("Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to infringe upon the
powers or functions of the Secretary of State").
182. 40 CONG. REC. 2140 (1906), quoted in WRIGHT-FOREIGN RELATIONS 322.
183. J. BERDAHL, supra note 159, at 25.
184. In the words of Senator Spooner:
We direct all of the other heads of departments to transmit to the Senate designated
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Congress cannot take away this power to conduct foreign affairs;
this notion has been brought out by the courts with respect to an
analogous area over which the President has exclusive powers, the
Commander-in-Chief function: "[While] Congress may increase the
Army, or reduce the Army, or abolish it altogether

. . .

as long as

we have a military force Congress cannot take away from the
President the supreme command."''

5

The President, as Commander-

in-Chief, has sole charge of the day-to-day conduct of military
affairs in theaters of battle, and Congress cannot control it.
Congress has the power not only to raise and support and govern armies but
to declare war. It has, therefore, the power to provide by law for carrying
on war. This power necessarily 'extends to all legislation essential to the
prosecution of war with vigor and success, except such as interferes with the
command of the forces and the conduct of campaigns. That power and duty
belong to the President as Commander-in-Chief. Both these powers are
derived from the Constitution, but neither is defined by that instrument. Their
extent must be determined by their nature, and by the principles of our
institutions.' 6

The traditional core area is seen, therefore, to embrace the power
both to conduct foreign affairs and make policy.' More specifically,
papers or information. We do not address directions to the Secretary of State, nor do
we direct requests, even to the Secretary of State. We direct requests to the real head
of that department, the President of the United States, and, as a matter of courtesy,
we add the qualifying words: "If in his judgment it is not incompatible with the public
interest". WRIGHT-FOREIGN RELATIONS 322.
Cf the immunity of the executive negotiating process from disclosure, note 175 supra.
185. Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 221 (1893), affd, 165 U.S. 553 (1897). In
the words of Justice Jackson, the President's position as Commander-in-Chief is, "something
more than an empty title." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 342 U.S. 579, 641
(1950) (concurring).
186. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866). Compare Senator Root's objection
to a proposed amendment to the Army appropriations bill of 1912, which would have limited
stationing troops to the United States, as an encroachment upon the President's Commanderin-Chief powers. The amendment was defeated. Nobleman 154. However, a rider to the
Defense Appropriations Act of 1970 limited use of combat troops in Laos and Thailand. 1970
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS xxix (Feb. 20, 1970). There have been subsequent suggestions to extend this to include Cambodia.
187. CORWIN-PRESIDENT 181. The Constitutional line between exclusive executive power
and congressional power is to be distinguished from a line that Senator Fulbright has drawn.
He has indicated that "it is important . . . to distinguish clearly between two kinds of power,
that pertaining to the shaping of foreign policy, to its direction and purpose and philosophy,
and that pertaining to the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy." Statement of Senator
Fulbright in Hearingson Separationof Powers 43. Compare:
The criteria of responsible and constructive debate are restraint in matters of detail and
the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy, combined with diligence and energy in
discussing the values, direction and purpose of American foreign policy. Just as it is
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the traditional core would seem to embrace all diplomatic and

Commander-in-Chief foreign affairs decisions, except for the
following particular classes :'81
(1) Certain matters affecting foreign commerce, including such
derived matters as immigration and passports;

(2) Certain matters of administrative detail;
(3) The withholding of appropriations altogether; 18
(4) Declarations of war;9 0
(5) Senate advice and consent to treaties and appointments.
Thus, the Constitution, as it has developed, has struck a balance. On
one side is exclusive executive power with respect to foreign affairs;
on the other, congressional participation.'19
an excess of democracy when Congress is overly aggressive in attempting to supervise
the conduct of policy, it is a failure of democracy when it fails to participate actively
in determining policy objectives and in the making of significant decisions. Id. at 44.
Senator Fulbright recognized, however, that there is an "overlap in practice between the
shaping and conduct of policy."
Foreign aid provides the closest thing we have to an annual occasion for a general
review of American foreign policy. It provides the opportunity for airing grievances,
some having to'do with economic development, most of them not, and for the
discussion of matters of detail which in many cases would be better left to specialists
in the field. It also provides the occasion for a discussion of more fundamental
questions, pertaining to America's role in the world, to the areas that fall within and
those which exceed its proper responsibilities.
Here, however, we encounter the overlap in practice between the shaping and conduct
of policy and, in order to exert our influence on the one, where it is desirable, we have
also had to exert it on the other, where it is not. Were the Executive more responsive
to'our general recommendations-as expressed in committee reports, conditional
proscriptions, and general legislative history-it would be possible for us to be more
restrained in our specific restrictions. Id.
How may the Senator's dividing line be reconciled with that of the Constitution? Possibly
the Senator is not talking about the Constitutional division, but rather one he believes more
desirable? Possibly the answer lies in semantics. The Senator's detail-which he leaves to the
executive-may indeed include policy forming powers, specifically with respect to foreign aid.
Or, it is possible that Senator Fulbright is in error as to the historically established line.
188. Compare the observation of Thomas Jefferson, note 171 supra.
189. The military appropriations and establishment powers should also be considered in this
connection.
190. The dividing line between this congressional power and the powers of the Commanderin-Chief is a vexed subject. See 81 HARv. L. REv., supra note 7.
191. This area of exclusive foreign affairs powers is to be distinguished from exclusive
domestic executive powers: the removal power and its possible corollary unitary management,
executive secrecy, executive immunity from congressional and committee "veto," and the free
exercise of such discretion as Congress leaves to it under statutes. "Domestic" may be a
misnomer, as some of these powers undoubtedly also apply to foreign affairs. The executive
has long asserted the power to withhold documents from Congress in the name of executive
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The Nature of the Congressional Controlsfrom which the
Traditional Core Area Is Immune. We have seen that Congress is

without substantive power to prevent or direct executive decisions
within the traditional core area of foreign affairs. We have also seen

that the appropriations power is not a directing power, even with
respect to domestic affairs. A dramatic illustration of the generally
recognized incapacity of Congress to direct the President in the core

area is the so-called RS-70 episode.19 In 1962 the House Armed
secrecy, and the Congress has to some extent acknowledged this power. See Bishop, The
Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477
(1957); Kramer & Marcuse, Executive Privilege-A Study of the Period 1953-1960, 29 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 623, 827 (1961); Younger, Congressional Investigations and Executive
Secrecy: A Study in the Separation of Powers, 20 U. PrrT. L. REv. 755, 771 (1959). ("To
admit that . . . what Congress creates it may control . . . would be to emasculate the
separation of powers").
The executive position, in which Congress has largely acquiesced, is that it has power to
make day-to-day decisions with respect to particular matters, such as the making of a loan,
a grant or a contract, the decision to build a project or close a base, or a personnel
decision-once the authority to do so has been delegated by legislation-without obtaining
subsequent approval from the Congress or any of its committees. This requirement has been
called a "committee veto" or "coming into agreement" with a committee. Address by
Assistant Attorney General Doub, Encroachments By the Congress Upon the Powers of the
Executive 9, June 15, 1959. The President has on occasions vetoed legislation with such
provisions; in more recent years he has at times approved the legislation but indicated he will
treat the provision in question as unconstitutional. Attorneys General have supported this
approach. The matter is explored in Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by
Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REv. 569 (1953); Newman &
Keaton, Congress and the Faithful Execution of Laws-Should Legislators Supervise
Administrators?41 CALIF. L. REV. 568 (1953). President Wilson's statement in a 1920 veto
message concerning "coming into agreement" requirements, suggests the line between the
executive and the legislature in the area of delegated legislative power:
The Congress has the power and the right to grant or deny an appropriation or to enact
or to refuse to enact a law; but once an appropriation is made or a law is passed, the
appropriation should be administered or the law executed by the executive branch of
the Government. In no other way can the Government be efficiently managed or
responsibility definitely fixed. The Congress has the right to confer upon its committees
full authority for purposes of investigation and the accumulation of information for
its guidance, but I do not concede the right, and certainly not the wisdom, of the
Congress of endowing a committee of either House or a joint Committee of both
Houses with Power to prescribe regulations under which executive departments may
operate. Hearingson Separation of Power 203.
192. The illustration is taken from the military area. The selection of a weapons system is
assumed to be in the core area. Hearings on Separation of Powers 40 (Senator Stennis: "I
feel like in choice of weapons that Congress has the power to decide what certain weapons
will be as between weapons. Frankly, I lean somewhat to the idea the Commander-in-Chief
has that power under military advice.").
Congressman Bass, during the debate on the RS-70, stated: "It is inconceivable to me that
Congress should tell a Commander-in-Chief what weapons system to develop any more than
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Services Committee intended that the President be "directed,

ordered, mandated, and required"''

to build certain planes.'94 The

measure was finally changed to an "authorization.' 9 5 Congressman
Ford, during the debate on the original RS-70 measure, in addition

to noting that it created practical inflexibility in the management of
the RS-70 program and usurped the authority of the appropriations

committee, stated that it would have been "an unconstitutional
invasion of the responsibilities of the Chief Executive" and "would

have invaded the responsibilities and jurisdiction of the Commander
in Chief .
''196 An earlier episode involved the foreign aid
program. In 1950 Congress sought to direct the President to make

a loan to Spain. Then, too, the President treated the direction as an
97
authorization.
It is when substantive and appropriations powers are linked that
matters become more complicated, because of the usually undoubted

power of Congress to withhold appropriations."' At what point does
legitimate withholding cross the line and become illegitimate
it should tell a general in the field which weapons to fire." 108 CONG. REC. 4719 (1962). See
generally CORWIN-PRESIDENT Ch. VI & n.7.
193. H.R. REP. No. 1406, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1962).

194. Id.
195. No doubt it is practically impossible for Congress to force the President to build
weapons he believes it inadvisable to build; President Truman refused to build 20 B-52's he
was "authorized" to build. CORWIN-PRESIDENT 137. Former Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara has stated that developments have shown the RS-70 to have been an unsound

project. R.

MCNAMARA, THE ESSENCE OF SECURITY

92 (1968).

196. 108 CONG. REC. 4714 (1962).
197. Nobleman 161. To be distinguished from executive decisions in the core area which
can not be directed are other decisions-possibly "ministerial"-which can. Kendall v. United
States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 118 (1838).
198. See notes 86-87 supra and accompanying text. While the absolute discretion of the
British House of Commons seems clear, McGuire, The New Deal and the Public Money, 23
GEO. L.J. 155, 157 (1935), and the colonial legislatures similarly asserted this right from the
beginning, id.at 158-61, some seem to have argued that the Constitution has limited this
discretion. In Lovett v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 142, 152 (Ct. Cl. 1945), affd, 328 U.S.
303 (1946), Judge Madden, concurring, stated "Congress might refuse to raise or appropriate
money to pay the President . . . . But . . . [this action] would not be taken pursuant to the
Constitution, but would be . . . [an act] of subversion and revolution, the exercise of mere
physical power, not lawful authority." So too Congressman Bayard remarked in 1837:
Let it be imagined that this country has a misunderstanding with a foreign power, and
that the executive should appoint a minister, but the house, in the plenitude of its power,
should refuse an appropriation. . . . Would not the house have contravened the
constitution by taking from the president the power which, by it, is placed in him? It

clearly would.

CORWIN-PRESIDENT

Ch. IV n.64.

As a practical matter, however, it is not clear how the power of Congress not to appropriate
could be denied.
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control? It seems clear that the availability of appropriations cannot
be conditioned on compliance with directions or prohibitions that
Congress could not legislate directly; it may not withhold funds for
failure of such compliance. Arguably, "[ilf the practice of attaching
invalid conditions to legislative enactments were permissible, it is
evident that the constitutional system of the separability of the
branches of Government would be placed in the gravest jeopardy."' 99
It has been further asserted that:
The argument that since Congress must provide funds if the President is to
enter into effective loan agreements with foreign nations, it may subject the
President's authority to prior Congressional approval is spurious. The
circumstance that Congress may deny funds does not, of course, authorize it
to engraft an unconstitutional condition on the grant of authority to commit
such funds .

. .

. The problem of intrusion into executive functions in

impermissible ways is not so easily avoided.m

Such unconstitutional limitations can take many forms. For
example, as previously discussed Congress sought to sever relations
with Russia by withholding funds for the staffing and maintenance
of the American Embassy.' Presumably conditions which provided
for a withdrawal of all funds from the State Department or merely
all funds to support our Embassy in Russia, unless the President
withdrew recognition of Russia, would also be invalid. The crux is
that the core area may not be in any way trespassed upon by
appropriations conditioned in the manner discussed. Such a trespass
on the removal power by an appropriations provision was
condemned by Judge Madden of the Court of Claims in Lovett v.
United States:212 "I do not think

. . .

that the power of the purse

199. 41 Op. Ai-r'Y GEN. 233 (1955) (statement of Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr.).
In 1955 Congress attached a condition to a Department of Defense Appropriations Act which
reserved to the Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate the right to disapprove
contracts entered into by the Secretary of Defense. The quoted statement was in an opinion
advising the President that the provision was in violation of the constitutional principle of
separation of powers.
The same argument was quoted by Attorney General William Rogers in an opinion to
President Eisenhower with respect to the question of executive secrecy involving the
International Cooperation Administration, an earlier foreign aid agency. Id. at 529 (1960).
Part II will discuss the issue in more detail.
200. Letter from Nicholas de B. Katzenbach to Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., Aug. 23, 1961.
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 74-(1935) ("An affirmance of the authority of Congress
• . . to condition the expenditure of an appropriation [upon the teaching of certain subversive
doctrines] would tend to nullify all constitutional limitations upon legislative power"); cf
Note, UnconstitutionalConditions, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1595, 1596-98 (1960).
201. See text accompanying notes 162-63 supra.
202. 66 F. Supp. 142 (Ct. Cl. 1945), affd, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). The court's opinion,
however, avoided the issue of whether Congress had the constitutional power. Id. at 148.
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may be constitutionally exercised to produce an unconstitutional
result such as a . . .trespass upon the constitutional functions of
another branch of the Government. ' ' 203 Justice Frankfurter echoed

this sentiment in his concurring opinion in the Supreme Court's
decision in Lovett when he spoke of the "grave consititutional" issue

that would be raised by an attempted invasion of the removal power
04

2
by means of the appropriations power.
There have been many historical episodes in which the question

of unconstitutional limitations has arisen. Probably none has elicited
a clearer statement of the issue with respect to foreign affairs than

the attempt by Congress to instruct our delegates to an 1826
conference in Panama by means of a rider to a bill appropriating

funds for such delegates' attendance. This attempt was termed
"unprecedented ' 20 5 by Daniel Webster, and was, in his opinion,
unconstitutional, as it was the legislators taking the proper

responsibility from the Executive and exercising
a power which, from its nature, belongs to the Executive, and not to us. It
was prescribing, by the House, the instructions for a Minister abroad. It was
nugatory, as it attached conditions which might be complied with, or might
not. And lastly, if the gentlemen thought it important io express the sense of
the House on these subjects, . . . the regular and customary way was by
resolution. . . . [W]e must make the appropriation without conditions, or
refuse it. The President has laid the case before us. If our opinion of the
character of the meeting, or its objects, led us to withhold the appropriation,
we had the power to do so. If we had not so much confidence in the
Executive, as to render us willing to trust to the constitutional exercise of the
Executive power, we have power to refuse the money. It is a direct question
of aye or no. If the Ministers . . .may not be trusted to act, like other
Ministers, under the instructions of the Executive, they ought not to go at
all.2a
203. Id. at 152 (concurring).
204. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 329 (1946).
205. 9 ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS 94 (T.Benton compiler 1858), quoted
in Nobleman 150. The rider was defeated and the funds appropriated but the delegates were
delayed too long by the debate over the rider to attend the conference. Nobleman 150. Then
Congressman Martin Van Buren similarly confirmed that Congress lacked the substantive
power to give the executive instructions in the matter. Compare the "unquestionably
unconstitutional" rider by which President Andrew Johnson's powers as Commander-in-Chief
were partially transferred to General Grant, CORWIN-PRESIDENr 463 n. 89, and the statement
by President Buchanan that the designation in an 1860 appropriations bill of one Captain
Meigs to supervise certain military construction would be construed as a mere preference as
it would otherwise be an unconstitutional interference with Commander-in-Chief powers. Id.
402 n.64.
206. 9 ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS 94-95 (T.Benton compiler 1858),
quoted in Nobleman 150.
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Congressman Findley has acknowledged Congress's awareness of
the difficulty with such conditions:
•.. I am very concerned about the long-term effect of the nuclear
proliferation treaty, and at one point I attempted to use the power of the
purse in the House to shut off the salaries of any State Department personnel
who might use their official time to advance that treaty.
* .* I must add my amendment did not get very far. The House is
reluctant to use the power of the purse in specific matters like this. 2 7

What these conditions do is apply pressure on the executive to

do something-or refrain from doing something-or lose
appropriations. Such pressure is constitutionally objectionable."0 8

There is a set of legislative provisions which raises more difficult
questions than "conditions," and they arise, again, from the power

to withhold appropriations. Congress can withhold appropriations
from an entire program;"' can it withhold them from increasingly
small segments of a program based on the President's independent

powers? Congressman McCormack has said that Congress has the
power "not to appropriate money for any particular purpose." ' '
This may be true in the sense that Congress cannot be forced to
appropriate funds; yet Congress cannot use this power to prevent the

President from recognizing a state or government, dispatching an
emissary to it, or specifying the rank of such emissary. 21 1 In this
respect, consider the statement of Senator Borah:
Undoubtedly the Congress may refuse to appropriate and undoubtedly the
Congress may say that an appropriation is for a specific purpose. In that
respect the President would undoubtedly be bound by it. But the Congress
could not, through the powers of appropriation, in my judgment, infringe
upon the right of the President to command whatever army he might find
212

207. 1967 Hearings235-36.
208. Cf United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 70-71 (1936) ("The taxing power may not be
used as the instrument to enforce a regulation of matters of state concern with respect to which
the Congress has no authority to interfere."). Whether such pressure is necessarily less
objectionable if the conditions are waivable is not clear. This question will be considered in
Part IIin connection with particular restrictions on foreign aid.
209. See note 191 supra.
210. 86 CONG. REc. 1173 (1940).
211. See notes 152-61 supra and accompanying text. See also L. WILMERDING, supra note
134, who reports many instances of the executive applying military appropriations to purposes
other than those specified on the ground that the appropriations legislation did not meet
executive requirements. These latter instances may represent no more than a species of
executivefait accompli. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
212. CORWIN-PRESIDENT 403 n.64.
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At what point is the President's "command" of the foreign aid
program "infringed"? Can Congress constitutionally divide the
appropriations into categorids of aid, as it has in fact often done,
limiting the amount for each? Can it "itemize" or earmark
appropriations, saying that so much shall be used for one country
and so much for another, or not at all? Congressman Mann believed
this could, in effect, be done. As he once phrased it, with respect to
an appropriation for the Army, "Our power to limit appropriations
is so conclusive that we can say that no money shall be given in this
bill except to red-headed men . .
,,'2
Yet if such itemization of
State Department appropriations were permitted, Congress might
specify the countries where the United States was to . maintain
embassies, or the ranks of American emissaries-things over which
Congress has no power.214 Thus, itemization seems too "nice" a way
for Congress to avoid the strictures of the Constitution.215
There are, of course, many ways, short of the kind of statutory
controls which this article maintains are proscribed, by which
Congress can check and balance the executive, even with respect to
the core area. These devices include: (1)various indirect means of
persuasion or compulsion and other private communications; (2)
clearances with key legislators and understandings which may or
may not be binding; (3) committee reports; (4) reports which the
executive can be required to make; (5) annual hearings with respect
to legislation and appropriations; (6) investigations which, although
in theory subject to a limitation that they be for a "legislative
purpose," can be a real source of pressure on the executive; (7)
annual appropriations, short term authorizations, and fiscal year
funds; (8) sense of Congress provisions, resolutions, and similar
"advice"; (9) the force of public opinion, the consensus building
process, and the prospect of elections; (10) the President's
"conscience" and "his sense of self-restraint," possibly the most
213. N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1922, at 17, col. 2.
214. See note 211 supra and accompanying text.
215. One is reminded of the words of James Madison:
The legislative department derives a superiority in our governments from other
circumstances. Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive, and less
susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask, under complicated
and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate
departments. It is not infrequently a question of real nicety in legislative bodies, whether
the operation of a particular measure, will, or will not extend beyond the legislative
sphere. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 334 (Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
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significant controls; and ultimately, (11) the "scarecrow" of
impeachment.
The congressional restraint required for the proper application of
statutory controls, as well as these other devices, will be a topic of
consideration in Part 11,216 where the general constitutional

standards controlling foreign affairs will be applied to foreign aid.
216. Part I I will appear in the June 1970 issue of the Journal

